A recently uncovered incident reveals significant lapses in oversight and compliance within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For seven months, the agency illegally retained a trove of sensitive data from the Chicago Police Department’s gang database, raising serious concerns about domestic surveillance practices.
In June 2021, an I&A field officer requested access to Chicago’s controversial gang database. This request stemmed from an FBI decision to expand its own transnational organized crime watchlist, called TADP (Transnational Organized Crime Actor Detection Program), to include the Latin Kings street gang. The goal of the DHS initiative was to see if local intelligence could be used to identify potential gang members flagged for inclusion on federal watchlists like the Terrorist Screening Dataset at airports and border crossings.
The problem? Chicago’s gang database is notoriously unreliable, riddled with inaccuracies and biased data points. Inspectors had previously warned that the police couldn’t accurately verify its contents. Entries contained impossible ages, nonsensical identifiers, and derogatory labels. This database was primarily used by local law enforcement, but its flaws carried significant consequences for individuals labeled as gang members:
- Immigration Enforcement: While Chicago operates under a “sanctuary city” policy limiting direct cooperation with ICE, the gang database carve-out allowed immigration officers to access data over 32,000 times within a decade.
- Criminal Justice Impacts: Allegations of gang membership, even without arrest or conviction, were used in court filings and sentencing hearings, potentially impacting bail and sentences.
Despite these red flags, DHS proceeded with the data request, but the process quickly fell into disarray. Internal review processes were bypassed, critical oversight deadlines were missed, and key personnel changed positions without passing the baton on project management.
The agreement, which ultimately dictated that all US citizen data should be purged within a year, was signed by an unauthorized individual. By April 2022, despite this supposed deadline, I&A still held onto nearly 800 files containing sensitive information about Chicago residents. The agency didn’t delete the data until November 2023, long after the required timeline had passed and a formal inquiry uncovered the violation.
This incident exposes several concerning trends:
- Lax Oversight: DHS lacks basic controls for tracking intelligence collection and use. It took a lengthy Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation to unearth this failure, which was coupled with an internal breach that left hundreds of sensitive reports accessible to unauthorized users.
- Eroding Civil Liberties Protections: By circumventing sanctuary city policies through data sharing agreements, DHS may be actively targeting individuals without lawful justification. This practice potentially violates the rights of US citizens and residents who have been unfairly labeled as threats.
- Unreliable Data Amplifying Bias: The reliance on Chicago’s flawed gang database highlights how biased and inaccurate data can fuel harmful surveillance practices.
While the Chicago data set has now been deleted, DHS continues to pursue expansive data-sharing initiatives, aiming to consolidate sensitive information across agencies. This raises serious questions about the agency’s commitment to protecting civil liberties and using accurate data responsibly in its intelligence work. Until robust oversight mechanisms are implemented and safeguards against biased data are strengthened, these risks will continue to escalate.
